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Abstract
Two  problems of importance in  computer  security  are
to  1) detect  the  presence of an intruder  masquerad-
ing as the valid user and 2) detect the perpetration of
abusive actions  on the part  of an otherwise innocuous
user.  We  have developed an approach to  these  prob-
lems that  examines sequences of  user  actions  (UNIX
commands)  to  classify  behavior as  normal or  anoma-
lous.  In this  paper we  explore the matching function
needed to  compare a current  behavioral  sequence to
a historical profile.  We  discuss the difficulties  of per-
forming matching in  human-generated data  and show
that  exact string  matching  is  insufficient  to this  do-
main. We  demonstrate a number  of  partial  matching
functions  and examine their  behavior  on user  com-
mand  data.  In  particular,  we explore  two methods
for weighting scores by adjacency of  matches  as well
as two growth functions (polynomial and exponential)
for scoring similarities.  We  find, empirically, that the
optimal similarity  measure  is  user dependant  but that
measures based on the  assumption of  causal  linkage
between user commands  are  superior  for  this  domain.
Keywords: Application,  Sequence  learning,  Partial
matching, Classification,  Recognition,  Computer  se-
curity,  Anomaly  detection,  Behavioral  modeling.
Introduction
A long-standing  problem in  the  field  of  computer secu-
rity  is  that  of intrusion  detection.  The goal is  to detect
violations  of  security  policy  for  a  computer  site  by an
outsider.  Of the  many  possible  approaches to  intrusion
detection,  one that  has  received  considerable  atten-
tion  is  anomaly detection  (Anderson, 1980; Lunt,  1990;
Heberlein,  Dias,  Levitt,  Mukherjee,  Wood  & Wolber,
1990).  According  to  Kumar  (1995),  "Anomaly detec-
tion  attempts  to  quantify  the  usual  or  acceptable  be-
havior and flags  other irregular  behavior as  potentially
intrusive."  Under  this  definition,  the  scope of anomaly
detection  encompasses not  only  violations  by an  out-
sider  but also  anomalies arising  from violations  on the
part  of  an authorized  user.  It  is  important to  note that
anomaly  detection  omits the  class  of  security  policy vi-
olations  that  occur within  the  bounds of  normal behav-
ior  for  a  system or  site.  Detecting  anomalous  behavior
can be  viewed as  a  binary  valued classification  prob-
lem in  which measurements of  system activity  such as
system log  files,  resource  usage,  command  traces,  and
audit  trails  are  used to  produce a  classification  of  the
state  of  the  system as  normal or  abnormal.
In  other  work (Lane & Brodley,  1997)  we have pre-
sented  a  system  intended  to  address  the  anomaly de-
tection  domain.  Our system learns  a  user  profile  and
subsequently  employs it  to  detect  anomalous behav-
ior.  Based on sequences  of  actions  (UNIX  commands)
of  the  current  user’s  input  stream,  the  system classi-
fies  current  behavior  as  consistent  or  anomalous with
past  behavior.  The anomaly detection  domain presents
a  number of  interesting  problems  including  learning
from positive  examples only,  handling  concept  drift,
and measuring  similarity  between sequences  of  human
actions.  We demonstrated  that  the  closed  world  as-
sumption can be used  to  address  the  positive  training
examples  difficulty,  and that  user behaviors can be dis-
tinguished  under a  particular  definition  of  behavioral
similarity  (Lane & Brodley,  1997).
In  this  paper we explore the  issue  of  similarity  mea-
surement  --  matching  a  current  behavioral  pattern
with  historical  behavior.  We  demonstrate  a  number
of  possible  matching  functions  and  examine  some of
the  behavioral  differences  among  them.
Capturing  the  Causal  Nature  of  User
Actions
Traditionally,  in  computer security,  user  profiles  have
been built  based on characteristics  such  as  resources
consumed,  typing  rate,  command issue  rate,  and
counts  of  particular  commands employed  (Denning,
1987;  Smaha, 1988;  Lunt,  1990;  Frank,  1994).  These
approaches  do  not  use  the  observation  that  hu-
man/computer  interaction  is  essentially  a  causal  pro-
cess.  Typically,  a  user has a goal to  achieve when  using
the  computer, which causes the  person to  issue  certain
commands, causing  the  computer  to  act  in  a  certain
manner.  The computer’s  response,  in  turn,  keys  fur-
ther  actions  on the  part  of  the  human.
User profiling  is  a widely studied  problem in the  lit-
eratures  of  computer security  and  machine learning.
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modeling are  in  anomaly detection  (as  described  pre-
viously)  and in  software  forensics  (Spafford  & Weeber,
1992).  Krsul  and  Spafford  (1996)  have  examined 
topic  of  authorship  analysis  and used a  set  of  software
metrics  such as  mean  line  length,  placement of  syntac-
tic  structures,  ratio  of  global to  local  variable  counts,
and ratio  of  white lines  to  code lines  to  identify  pro-
gram authors.  Such metrics  focus  on global  statistics
but  do not  address  causal  sequences of  actions.  Fur-
thermore,  they  allow  an encoding of  domain knowledge
(in  terms  of  the  higher-level  features  employed) but
may  overlook other  characteristics  present  in the  data.
Machine learning  researchers  have studied  modeling of
human behavior  in  the  contexts  of,  for  example,  au-
tomatic  tutoring  (Baffes  & Mooney, 1996).  This  work
models a student’s  understanding of  a  subject  as  a  set
of  Horn-clauses which defines  deviations  from the  cor-
rect  theory of  the  subject.  Such a  system can work  well
when the  domain theory  is  sufficiently  understood  to
induce such rules  from behavior,  but this  is  often  not
the  case  in  the  context  of  arbitrary  command  process-
ing  systems (a  sufficiently  thorough domain theory for
this  context  might well include  a complete model of the
system state  --  a  computationally  infeasible  proposi-
tion).
To form a  user profile  our  approach learns  character-
istic  sequences of  actions  generated by users.  The un-
derlying  hypothesis is  that  a user responds in  a similar
manner to  similar  situations,  leading  to  repeated  se-
quences  of  actions.  Indeed,  the  existence  of  command
alias  mechanisms in  many UNIX  command  interpreters
supports  the  idea  that  users  tend  to  perform many  re-
peated sets  of  actions,  and that  these  sequences differ
on a per-user basis.  It  is  the differences in  characteris-
tic  sequences that  our approach uses  to  differentiate  a
valid  user  from an intruder  masquerading  as  that  user.
Note that  the  detection  of  anomalous behavior  is  made
more difficult  because an informed,  malicious  intruder
may attempt  to  emulate the  valid  user’s  behavior,  in-
cluding  alias  and command  usage.
To represent  characteristic  patterns  of  actions,  our
system uses  the  sequence (an ordered,  fixed-length  set
of  temporally  adjacent  actions)  as  the  fundamental
unit  of  comparison.  For  this  research,  actions  were
taken  to  be  UNIX  shell  commands with  their  argu-
ments,  although  the  approach  developed  here  is  gen-
eral  and  can  be  extended  to  any  stream  of  discrete
events such as  operating  system calls  or  graphical  user
interface  events.
A set  of  behavioral  sequences (gathered  from a,  pre-
sumably, intruder-free  history)  is  collected  into  a dic-
tionary  of  sequences.  This dictionary,  along with sys-
tem parameters  such  as  sequence length,  instance  se-
lection  policy,  noise-suppression  function,  and classi-
fication  threshold,  forms a user  profile.  Any new  se-
quence under scrutiny  can be  compared to  the  dictio-
nary (as  described  below to  yield  a  measure of’famil-
iarity’  or  ’similarity’  to  past behavior.  This similarity
measure is  then used as  the  basis  for  classification  of
the  sequence  as  anomalous or  normal.
We  envision  our  anomaly detection  system  as  part
of  a  personal  software  assistant  that  helps  monitor a
user’s  account for  penetrations.  We  hope that,  in  con-
junction  with  techniques  that  employ more domain-
specific  knowledge (such  as  rule-base  systems or  sys-
tems employing user-selected  higher-level  features),
our techniques  can provide a  basis  for  greater  security
and privacy for  users  and sites.  Because of  privacy is-
sues,  and the  fact  that  it  is  impossible to  characterize
the  full  space  of  user  behaviors,  only  positive  exam-
ples  of  the  account owner’s behavior  are  available  for
training.
Norton  has  explored  sequence learning  for  DNA  se-
quences (Norton,  1994),  but his  data  had both positive
and  negative  training  examples.  The anomaly detec-
tion  domain differs  from traditional  concept formation
tasks  in  that  one must characterize  user  behavior  from
"positive"  examples  only.  To resolve  this  difficulty  we
invoked  the  closed  world assumption --  that  anything
not  seen in  the  historical  data  represents  a different
user.  Intuitively,  it  seems likely  that  this  is  a reason-
able  assumption --  the  very  terms  anomaly, abnormal,
and  unusual  imply that  divergence  from past  behavior
is  an important indication  of  trouble.
It  is  interesting  to  note  that  a  separate  research
group  has  independently  developed  an  anomaly  de-
tection  technique  based  on examination  of  sequences
(Forrest,  Hofmeyr, Somayaji & Longstaff,  1996a;  For-
rest,  Hofmeyr & Somayaji,  1996b).  Their  work, while
similar  in  intent,  focuses on monitoring the  behavior of
privileged  programs (UNIX  system  daemons) to  detect
exploitation  of  services  by malicious  users.  Monitoring
processes  entails  a  different  set  of  problems and goals
than  does  monitoring  users.  Their  system  examines
the  sequences of  system calls  emitted  by running  pro-
cesses.  Both the  set  of  possible  system calls  and the
possible  orderings  of  those  calls  are  from a  more re-
stricted  set  than  the  space of  user-level  commands  and
command  sequences,  so  strict  equality  matching has  a
much  higher probability  of  yielding  useful  results.  Fur-
thermore,  system calls  are  emitted  by system services
much more quickly  than  are  commands by users  (po-
tentially  107 times  as  quickly).  Thus,  many  fewer re-
sources  can be devoted to  processing  each sequence of
system calls  than can be devoted to  processing each se-
quence of  user  commands.  It  is  particularly  intriguing
that  this  research  group  arrived  at  a  sequence based
detection  system  through  a  model of  the  human im-
munological  system,  while  our  system has  its  origins
in  a  behavioral  model.  The degree  of  convergence  in
the  systems suggests  the  possibility  of  congruences in
the  underlying  models and,  perhaps,  even in  the  orig-
inal  human systems.
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Once  a  user  profile  is  formed, the  basic  action  of  the
detection  system  is  to  compare  incoming  input  se-
quences to  the  historical  data and form an opinion as to
whether or  not they  both represent  the  same user.  The
fundamental  unit  of  comparison in  the  anomaly detec-
tor  system  is  the  command  sequence.  Dietterich  and
Michalski  (1986)  have  studied  the  problem of  learn-
ing  to  predict  sequences by fitting  sequence data  to
a  model from a  space  of  possible  models.  Their  goal
was to  create  a  system that  could  predict  subsequent
actions  in  the  sequence,  whereas our  goal  is  to  clas-
sify  sequences of  new  actions  as  consistent  or  inconsis-
tent  with sequence history.  To this  end,  all  input  to-
ken streams  are  segmented into  overlapping  sequences
of  tokens  (where the  length  of  each sequence is  a pa-
rameter to  the  system,  but  is  fixed  for  a  single  run).
Two  sequences can then  be compared using  a  similarity
measure.
Computing  Sequence  Similarity
One  approach to  learning  from sequence data  is  to  con-
vert  the  data into  feature  vectors  by accumulating mea-
sures  of  the  individual  sequences (Hirsh  &: Japkowicz,
1994; Salzberg,  1995).  Then one can apply any off  the
shelf  classifier  construction  algorithm such as a  neural
network or  a  decision  tree  to  the  feature  vectors  that
describe  the  sequence data.  By contrast,  our  approach
uses  a  measure of  similarity  between sequences to  com-
pare  current  input  to  historical  data.  Direct  analysis
of  the  user’s  command  stream  avoids  introduction  of
the  domain knowledge required  to  construct  higher-
level  features.  Our hypothesis is  that  these  two classes
of  approaches  are  complimentary  and  that  a  system
incorporating  may well  be more effective  than  either
individually.
A number of  possible  methods exist  for  measuring
the  similarity  of  two sequences.  The most straightfor-
ward is  the  equality  function,  which yields  TRUE  when
both sequences match in  every  position  and FALSE  oth-
erwise.  This  is  the  similarity  function  employed by
string  matching  algorithms  and  has  the  advantage  of
being widely studied  and highly  optimizeable.  For ex-
ample,  the  UNIX  di:ff  program employs this  form of
matching.  Srikant  and  Agrawal (1996)  use  a  modified
equality  matching function  to  detect  frequently  occur-
ring  sequences in  large  data  sets;  they  allow gaps,  or
intervening  non-matching elements,  in  their  sequence
detection.  In  spite  of  the  (presumed)  causal  nature
of  human-generated  command sequences,  we do  not
expect  exact  matches  for  reasonably  long  sequences
because of  unpredictable  and asynchronous events  (ar-
rival  of mail,  telephone calls,  etc.),  which  can be viewed
as  noise  distorting  the  causally-driven  process.  Thus,
the equality  function is  not a viable  choice for this  par-
ticular  domain.  Equality  matching can,  however, be  a
viable  technique  for  other  aspects  of  anomaly detec-
tion  in  computer security,  as  demonstrated by Forrest,
et  al.  (1996b).
Our system,  therefore,  computes a  numerical  simi-
larity  measure that  returns  a  high value  for  pairs  of
sequences that  it  believes  to  have close  resemblance,
and a  low value to  pairs  of  sequences that  it  believes
largely  differ.  The individual  elements of the  sequences
are  from  an  unordered  set,  which creates  a  matching
problem identical  to  that  of  symbolic features  for  IBL.
However,  unlike  IBL, our  similarity  measure is  judging
the  similarity  between two sequences  rather  than  two
feature  vectors.
Initially,  we examined  a  similarity  measure that  sim-
ply  assigns  a  score  equal  to  the  number of  identical
tokens  found  in  the  same locations  of  the  two se-
quences.  Upon consideration,  however,  we hypothe-
sized  that  a  measure that  assigns  a  higher  score  to
adjacent  identical  tokens  than  to  separated  identical
tokens might be preferable.  The intuition  is  that  token
matches  separated  by interleaving  non-matching  to-
kens are  more likely  to  have occurred  by chance,  while
adjacent  matches are  more likely  to  have occurred  due
to  a  causal  process.  Therefore,  if  sequence Seql  has  k
tokens  in  common  with each  of  Seq2 and Seq3,  but  the
common  tokens  are  adjacent  in  Seql  and Seq2  then  we
would like  the  similarity  measure to  have the  property
that  Sim(Seq1,  Seq2)  > Sim(Seql,  Seq3).  Under this
requirement,  the  pair  of  sequences shown below on the
left  would have a  higher  similarity  value  than  would
the  pair  on the  right.
is  foo  ;  vi is-i  foo  ;
is  foo  cat  bar Is  -F  foo  cat
Thus, one axis  of  differentiation  between similarity
measures is  ’does not  detect  match adjacency’  vs.  ’de-
tects  match adjacency’.  A second  axis  is  the  bound
of  the  maximum  similarity  measure  as  a  function  of
sequence  length.  The similarity  measure that  scores
sequences from a  count of  matches, regardless  of  adja-
cency,  has  an  upper  bound that  is  polynomial  in  the
length  of  the  sequences.  Specifically,  for  sequences of
length  n,  this  measure is  _< n.  We  denote this  similar-
ity  measure  as  MC-P  (for  match  count  with  polyno-
mial  bound).  To examine the  hypothesis  that  detect-
ing match adjacency is  useful  for  this  task,  we modified
MC-P  to  bias  the  similarity  score  in  favor  of  adjacent
matches (as  described  below).  This measure is  denoted
MCA-P  (for  match  count  with  adjacency  and  polyno-
mial  bound)  and  is  bounded by  n(n  + 1)/2.  A poly-
nomial bound seems appropriate,  considering  that  the
central  hypothesis is  that  adjacent  tokens  are  produced
by a  (mostly)  causal  process,  and,  therefore,  should
display  a high degree of  correlation.
In  a  stream  of  independently  generated  tokens,  it
seems likely  that  an  exponentially  bounded function
would be  more appropriate.  Our intuition  is  that  the
causal  linkage  of  user-generated  tokens  will  evidence
itself  as  a  deviation  from the  characeristics  of the  in-
dependence assumption.  To test  our  hypothesis  (i.e.
reject  the  independence hypothesis),  we examined the
45f(Sim, c) u(c)
MC-P Sim + 1 1
MCA-P Sim + c c+l
MC-E 2 ¯  Sim 1
MCA-E Sim + c 2,e
Table 1:  scoring  and update functions  for  the  similarity
measures
behavior  of  exponentially  bounded measures analogous
to  the  polynomially  bounded ones  just  described.  The
MC-P  measure was modified  to  score  exponentially  in
the  number  of  matches (still  without considering  adja-
cency)  and  was labeled  MC-E. The MC-E  measure  has
upper  bound 2n.  The MCA-P  measure  was adapted  in
a  similar  fashion  to  create  MCA-E,  whose upper  bound
is  2n -  1.  All four  similarity  measures are  encompassed
by the  following algorithm  operating  on sequences Seql
and Seq2:
¯ Set  an  adjacency  counter,  c  :=  1 and  the  value  of
the  measure,  Sim :=  0.
¯  For each position,  i,  in the  sequence length,  n:
-  If  Seql(i )  = Seq2(i )  then  Sim :=  f(Sim,  c)  and
e :=  u(c)
- Otherwise, c :=  1.
¯ After  all  positions  are  examined, return  the  measure
value.
The differences  between the  measures  are  determined
by the  nature  of  the  scoring  function,  f(Sim,  c),  and
the  adjacency  update function,  u(c),  as  summarized  in
Table 1.
Finally,  we define the  similarity  of a  single  sequence
Seqi to a  set  of sequences, D, as:
Sim(Seqi ,D)  = max {Sim(Seqi,Seqj)}
SeqjED
Thus, the  similarity  of  a sequence  to  the  user dictionary
is  the  measure of  that  sequence compared to  the  most
similar  sequence in  the  dictionary.
Classifying  User  Behavior
Given  an  input  stream  of  command  tokens  parsed  by
the  data  collection  module (as  described  in  (Lane
Brodley,  1997)),  the  detection  module classifies  the
current  user  as  normal or  anomalous after  each token.
The output  of  the  detection  module is  a  stream of  bi-
nary decisions  indicating,  at  each  point  in  the  input
command  data,  whether or  not  it  believes  that  the  in-
put stream at  that  point  was generated by the  profiled
user.
To make  these  decisions,  the  detection  module first
calculates  the  similarity  of  each input  sequence to  the
user’s  dictionary,  yielding  a  stream of  similarity  mea-
sures.  In  an intuitive  sense,  this  stream represents  the
familiarity  of  the  input  commands  at  each time  step,
given  knowledge about  the  previous  behavior  of  the
user.  The similarity  stream is  smoothed  to  reduce noise
(Lane & Brodley, 1997) and classification  is  performed
for  each time step.  In  the  current  implementation  the
classification  is  made  with a  threshold  decision:  if  the
current  smoothed similarity  measure is  between  max-
imum and  minimum allowable  bounds,  then  classify
the  current  time step  as  normal, otherwise  classify  it
as  abnormal.  The thresholds  are  system  parameters
and  were selected  empirically  by examining  an  inde-
pendent ’parameter  selection’  data  set  drawn from the
command  history  of  the  profiled  user.  After  comput-
ing  sequence similarity  to  the  user  profile  (under  the
currently  selected  similarity  measure) for  each item in
the  parameter  selection  data  set,  the  thresholds  were
selected  such that  a proportion  of err_rate  samples fell
outside  the  thresholds  (specifically,  err_rate~2 below
the  minimum  threshold  and err_rate~2  above the  max-
imum  threshold).  A smaller  allowed error  rate,  there-
fore,  corresponds  to  a  wider range of  acceptable  simi-
larities.  We  acknowledge  that  this  classification  scheme
is  relatively  unsophisticated,  but it  turns  out to  per-
form surprisingly  well  in  many  cases.  We  are  currently
investigating  employing other  non-parametric  classifi-
cation  techniques,  such as  clustering  with Parzen win-
dows (Fukunaga, 1990),  to  this  task.
Examination  of  Similarity  Measures
To examine the  degree  of  class  separation  produced by
each of  these  similarity  measures, we used each to  clas-
sify  user  command  history  traces.  The data  were com-
mand  histories  collected  from five  members  of  the  Pur-
due  MILLENNIUM  lab  over  the  course  of  slightly  more
than  an  academic  semester  and  two sets  donated  by
other  students.  From  each  user’s  data  set,  two thirds
of  the tokens were devoted to training  (i.e.  initial  dic-
tionary  construction)  and the  remaining one third  was
divided into 1000 testing  instances  and the rest  into  in-
stances  used for  dictionary  instance  selection  and pa-
rameter selection.  The user  profiles  were initialized
with all  available  training  data  and were pruned down
to  the  desired  testing  sizes  of  200,  500,  or  1000 se-
quences  via  the  LRU  instance  selection  algorithm  as
described  in  (Lane 8z  Brodley,  1997).  The LRU  (Least
Recently  Used, by analogy  with  the  page replacement
algorithm  of  the  same name) prunes instances  from the
dictionary  by examining the  timestamps of  their  last
reference  (the  last  point  at  which they were selected  as
’most similar’  to  an  instance  under examination)  and
removing those  with  the  oldest  timestamps.
All  experiments  employed a  sequence  length  of  ten
tokens  and  a  smoothing  window length  of  eighty  se-
quences.  These values  were selected  based on previous
experimentation  (Lane &; Brodley, 1997).  Profiles  were
created for  four of the  users and then the  test  data from
all  seven users  were classified  against  the  profiles  ac-
cording to  each similarity  measure. The classification
thresholds  were selected  to achieve a  false-negative  er-
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tailed  above). Results  of the  experiments are  displayed
in  Tables 2 and 3.  The results  given  here  are  typical
and are  generally  reflective  of  the  trends  we found in
the  data.
Each value  in  this  table  reports  the  percentage  of
instances  for  which the  tested  user  was identified  as
the  profiled  user.  The goal,  therefore,  is  to  minimize
all  rows other  than  the  profiled  user  and to  maximize
the  row corresponding to  the  profiled  user (USEI:t0, in
Table  2 and USER2,  in  Table  3).  In  Table 3,  the  sym-
bol ’t’  indicates  the  position  in  which the  best  value
occurs  for  each  user.  As above,  MC  and  MCA  denote
match count  and match count  with  adjacency  bias  sim-
ilarity  measures, respectively,  while the  suffixes  P and
E indicate  that  the  similarity  measure’s upper bound
is  polynomial or  exponential  in  the  length  of  the  se-
quence.
Table 2 indicates  a  definite  superiority  of  MC-P  for
the  task  of  identifying  the  profiled  user  (USER0)  but
somewhat  inferior  behavior  on the  task  of  distinguish-
ing  other  users  from  USER0.  By contrast,  all  other
algorithms  perform spectacularly  when distinguishing
other  users  from the  profiled  user  but  have what is
likely  to  be an unacceptably high false  negative  rate.
Unfortunately,  the  behaviors  of  many of  the  similar-
ity  measures are  nearly identical  for  large  parts  of the
tested  space, so it  is  difficult  to identify  their  relative
merits  from this  data.  Nonetheless,  for  USER0’s  pro-
file,  the  MC-P  similarity  measure seems to  be  prefer-
able.  This result  provides evidence against  the  hypoth-
esis  that  detecting  adjacent  matches is  desirable.
The results  in  Table 3 indicate  that,  overall,  MCA-P
is  the  preferable  similarity  measure for  USER2’s  pro-
file,  followed  by MCA-E.  A strong  preference  for  the
adjacency-based  measures is  supportive  of  the  hypoth-
esis  of  the  causality  of  command  sequences.  And, as
with  USER0, preference  for  the  polynomial  bounded
similarity  measure further  supports  this  hypothesis.
It’s  also  noteworthy that  the  MC-P  algorithm  has  the
poorest  performance for  this  user  (often  dramatically
so).  This indicates  that  there  are  cases in  which equal-
ity  matching (with  the  addition  of  ’don’t  care’  posi-
tions)  is  insufficient  to  the  task  of  user modeling in
this  context.
Together  the  results  for  USER0  and  USER2  demon-
strate  that  different  similarity  measures are  appropri-
ate  for  different  users.  This indicates  that  there  is  a
need for  a  method to  detect  which similarity  measure
is  appropriate  for  a  particular  user  and  that  future
research  should  take  this  into  account.  This issue  is
further  complicated by the  possibility  that  the  opti-
mal similarity  measure may be time variant  within  the
context of  a single  user.  Finally,  the  possibility  exists
(and is  supported to a  certain  degree by the  data in Ta-
ble  3)  that  the  optimal similarity  measure depends also
upon the nature  of  the  anomaly  (i.e.  the identity  of  the
masquerading  user).  This presents  a  difficulty  because,
as  mentioned in  previously,  the  only data  available  for
training  is  that  of the  valid user.
Finally,  note that  there  is  a  significant  disparity  be-
tween optimal dictionary  sizes  for  the  users  (1000 vs.
200 sequences).  This  seems to  indicate  that  USER2’s
behavior  is  characterized  by a  smaller  set  of  actions
than  is  USER0’s. The possibility  remains,  however,
that  none of  the  similarity  measures investigated  here
are  really  appropriate  for  measuring USER,0’s behav-
ior,  and that  under a  different  measure fewer character-
istic  sequences  would be  required.  Upon examination,
however, we note  that  instance  selection  (via  the  LRU
algorithm,  as  described  above)  was performed  with
only 1667 tokens of  data  for  USER0’s  profile  while over
5000 tokens were available  for  dictionary  initialization.
When  a  small  number of  sequences  are  rated  as  highly
characteristic  by the  instance  selection  algorithm,  so
few of  the  other  dictionary  instances  will  be  touched
that  selection  becomes  effectively  random  for  sequences
other  than  the  most strongly  characteristic  ones.  This
turns  out  to  be  the  case  for  USER0  as  approximately
260 of  the  instance  selection  sequences were devoted
to  selecting  only two of the  final  dictionary  sequences.
Thus,  we hypothesize  that  for  USER0  the  LRU  in-
stance  selection  algorithm  concentrates  undue atten-
tion  on sequences that  are  not necessarily  reflective  of
true  behavior  while  selecting  the  majority  of  the  in-
stances  effectively  randomly.  Therefore  a  large  num-
ber of sequences are required  in the  final  profile  to  ob-
tain  reasonable  accuracy.  By contrast,  LRU  seems to
select  important  instances  much  more successfully  for
USER2  so fewer are  needed in  the  final  profile.  Any  se-
quences in the  profile  beyond those  most characteristic
of  behavior  represent  noise  and lead  to  decreased per-
formance (and,  indeed,  degraded performance was seen
in  the case of  USER2’s  profile  for larger  final  dictionary
sizes).  The behavior  demonstrated  here  highlights  an
interaction  between the  similarity  measure and the  in-
stance  selection  algorithm,  which makes it  likely  that
choice of similarity  measure is  affected  not only by the
identity  of  the  profiled  user and intruder  (and possibly
time/concept  drift)  but  also  by the  choice  of  instance
selection  technique.
Conclusions  and  Future  Work
This paper  has examined some of  the  issues  involved  in
similarity-based  matching of  user  behavior  sequences.
We  find  that  the  best  measure is  user-dependent  and
there  are  indications  that  it  may  also  depend on choice
of  instance  selection  technique  and even the  identity
of  the  anomalous/intrusive  user.  There  do,  however,
seem to  be  indications  that  polynomially  bounded
measures and  measures  biased  in  support  of  adjacent
matches are,  overall,  preferable.  Both the  adjacency
and  the  polynomial  bound  are  evidence  in  support
of  the  hypothesis  that  user  behavioral  sequences  are
characterized  by strong  correlations  among  temporally
close  command  tokens.
47MC-P MCA-P MC-E MCA-E
USER0 93.96 67.07 73.44 79.36
USER1 9.11 0.00 0.00 8.23
USER2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
USER3 15.37 0.00 0.00 0.00
USER4 5.49 0.00 0.00 0.00
USER5 10.54 0.00 0.00 0.00
USER6 10.87 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 2:  Detections  over all  users  and similarity  measures for  USER0’s  profile,  dictionary  of  1000 sequences
MC-P MCA-P MC-E MCA-E
USER0 60.92 33.48 52.69 29.75 t
USER1 68.72 70.14  "~ 77.06 73.77
USER2 93.85 99.89 99.89 99.89
USER3 61.25 48.30 t 52.47 54.99
USER4 34.80 33.26 t 39.08 35.13
USER5 79.69 75.74 t 87.16 87.38
USER6 81.78 70.58 83.53 68.06 t
Table 3:  Detections  over all  users  and similarity  measures for  USER2’s  profile,  dictionary  of  200 sequences
Future  directions  for  this  work include  examination
of  other  forms of  similarity  measures. We  are  also  ex-
amining the  possibility  of  replacing  the  simple thresh-
old classification  system employed here  with  either  a
non-parametric  clustering  classification  system based
on Parzen  windows (Fukunaga,  1990)  or  a  classifica-
tion  system based  on Hidden Markov Models (Rabiner,
1989) of  user  behavior.  Under any of  these  classifica-
tion  schemes, the  problem of the  selection  of an optimal
similarity  measure for  each user  needs to  be  examined.
Finally,  the  issue  of  concept drift  must be addressed,
including  the  influence  of  concept drift  on the  optimal
similarity  measure.
One issue  that  must  be  kept  in  mind when deal-
ing  with  concept  drift  is  that  of  informed malicious
users.  Such users are  presumed  to  be aware of  all  secu-
rity  measures in  place,  including  the  anomaly  detection
system and user  profiles.  Thus, the  anomaly detection
system must be resistant  to  deliberate  training  --  that
is,  it  should,  ideally,  be able  to  distinguish  genuine
concept drift  on the part  of a  legitimate  user from dis-
tortions  introduced  by a malicious  user  to  subvert  the
security  measures.
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